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The European Union (EU) has committed itself to the promotion and the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in political statements, most recently in the EU Global Strategy.
When taking a closer look at the activities of the EU in the context of humanitarian crises that
can be brought within the R2P framework, the strength and effectiveness of the EU’s support
might be questioned. This article examines the EU’s interest in the R2P by addressing the
factors that inspired the EU’s openness towards the concept and by examining whether the EU’s
commitment to the R2P falls within its general ambitions to contribute to international security or
whether the EU is placing human suffering at the core of its considerations. In addition, this
article questions to what extent the EU is capable of pursuing its own interest in the R2P and to
what extent the EU is held back in implementing its commitment to the R2P by differing EU
Member State approaches. It will be shown that the EU is strongly committed to fulfilling its
collective responsibilities in partnership with the United Nations and that the focus of the EU’s
activities has been put on atrocity prevention.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is comprised of three interlinked pillars – pillar
one on the ‘protection responsibilities of the state’, pillar two on ‘international
assistance and capacity building’ and pillar three on a ‘timely and decisive response’.1
Under the concept of the R2P which has been endorsed by the United Nations (UN)
in the 2005 World Summit2 and which is being further developed through reports of
the UN Secretary-General, states bear the primary responsibility to protect their
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.3
The international community, which is not limited to states as traditional actors in
international law but also includes regional organizations, is asked to assist states so that
they are well-positioned to fulfil their protection responsibilities.4 In case a state is
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3 Secretary-General, supra n. 1, at para. 11(a).
4 Ibid., at para. 11(b).
manifestly failing to protect its population from the so-called atrocity crimes,5 the
international community is asked to step in to end severe and grave violations of
human rights.6
The European Union (EU) has committed itself to the R2P in political
statements, most recently in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and in the New
European Consensus on Development.7 When taking a closer look at the EU’s
activities in the context of humanitarian crises that can be brought within the
framework of the R2P, the strength and effectiveness of the EU’s commitment in
fulfilling its collective responsibility under the R2P might be questioned. The EU
has not conducted a military crisis management operation to stop atrocity crimes,
yet and has often appeared to be unable to speak with a strong voice during the
humanitarian crisis in Libya in 2011 and during the ongoing Syrian conflict. The
lack of military engagement of the EU in the context of Libya, which is often
considered to be the first time the UN Security Council authorized the use of
force in the name of R2P,8 and the non-use of military measures in Syria, are
underlined by the preparedness of individual EU Member States to militarily act
outside the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the spirit of
the R2P.
In the context of the Libyan crises, EU Member States’ differing national
economic and political interests in the country became apparent.9 Germany, a
non-permanent UN Security Council member at the time, had abstained from a
vote in the UN Security Council, while the permanent members France and the
UK supported a military intervention.10 Nine EU Member States contributed to
5 See e.g. Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to Early Action, A/
72/884-S/2018/525 (1 June 2018), at n. 1. Ethnic cleansing is not an international crime but it
includes acts that can constitute a crime specified under international criminal law, in particular crimes
against humanity and genocide.
6 Secretary-General, supra n. 1, para. 11(c).
7 EU, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign
and Security Policy 42 (June 2016); Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Commission, The New European Consensus on Development: ‘Our World, Our Dignity, Our
Future’, para. 66 (2017).
8 See UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011).
In 2013, the European Parliament viewed UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to make explicit
reference to the R2P. See European Parliament, European Parliament Recommendation to the Council of 18
Apr. 2013 on the UN Principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (‘R2P’), (2012/2143(INI)), P7_TA(2013)
0180 (2013).
9 T. Haesebrouck & M. Van Meir Venne, EUFOR RCA and CSDP Crisis Management Operations: Back
on Track?, 20(2) Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 267–85, 272–73 (2015).
10 P. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy 182 (Cambridge
University Press 2013); J. Wouters, P. De Man & M. Vincent, The Responsibility to Protect and Regional
Organisations: Where Does the European Union Stand?, in Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice
247–70, 262 (J. Hoffman & A. Nollkaemper eds, Pallas Publications-Amsterdam University Press
2012).
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NATO Operation Unified Protector.11 In light of the atrocities committed in
Syria, some EU Member States domestically discussed the use of force against the
Assad regime in 2013.12 In April 2018, in reaction to the alleged use of chemical
weapons and following further failed attempts to acquire UN Security Council
authorization, the UK and France, together with the US, carried out targeted
airstrikes on chemical weapons facilities in Syria, aimed at stopping the use of
chemical weapons against the civilian population.13
The diverging interests and preferences of EU Member States in the R2P
impacted on the EU’s choice of crisis management measures. Short of the use of
force, the EU fulfilled its collective responsibility in Libya through the adoption of
restrictive measures, long-term stabilization initiatives, and humanitarian
assistance.14 In the context of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the EU has expressed
its commitment to the R2P through the adoption of economic sanctions and
currently acts as the ‘main humanitarian donor for Syrians, with over EUR 16.9
billion mobilized collectively with EU Member States in humanitarian, develop-
ment, economic and stabilization assistance’.15 So far, the EU has avoided strong
comments on unilateral EU Member State activities outside the EU framework. In
the context of the use of force in Syria without a UN Security Council authoriza-
tion, the EU was careful in its reaction and the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy expressed the support ‘of all efforts aimed at the
prevention of the use of chemical weapons’, highlighting that ‘[a]ccountability is
a must’, and at the same time stressing the need for a political solution to the Syrian
conflict.16
The EU’s cautious reaction generates a number of questions for the EU’s
relationship with the R2P. They relate in particular to the identification of the
EU’s interest in the R2P as a regional organization, and to what extent the EU is
capable of pursuing its own interest in the R2P and to what extent the EU is held
back in implementing its commitment to the R2P by differing Member State
11 Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Romania and the UK.
12 A. Henriksen & M. Schack, The Crisis in Syria and Humanitarian Intervention, 1(1) J. on the Use of
Force & Int’l L., 122–47, 126–27 (2014). On the UK’s debate, see C. Henderson, The UK
Government’s Legal Opinion on Forcible Measures in Response to the Use of Chemical Weapons by the
Syrian Government, 64(1) Int’l & Comp. L. Q., 179–96 (2015).
13 Security Council Report, What’s in Blue, Insights on the Work of the UN Security Council, Syria: A
Council Divided (17 Apr. 2018), www.whatsinblue.org/2018/04/syria-a-council-divided.php.
14 J. Schmidt, The European Union and the Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Libya, Syria and Mali, in
Beyond Responsibility to Protect: Generating Change in International Law 123–45, 138–40 (R. Barnes & V.
Tzevelekos eds, Intersentia 2016); EU, EU-Libya Relations (Factsheet), Unique ID: 170125_11
(Brussels 9 Nov. 2018).
15 Schmidt, supra n. 14, at 142–44; EEAS, EU Response to the Syrian Crisis (Factsheets), Unique ID:
170314_11 (Brussels 8 Mar. 2019).
16 Declaration by the High Representative Federica Mogherini on Behalf of the EU on Strikes in Syria, Press
Release 196/18 (14 Apr. 2018).
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approaches to the R2P. The identification of the EU’s interest in the R2P in this
contribution is based on insights gained by conducting interviews with members of
the European Parliament (EP), with policy officers of the European External
Action Service (EEAS), and with representatives of selected European Member
States, including members of the national Parliament of the Federal Republic of
Germany (German Bundestag) and the UK Parliament’s House of Lords. The
detection of the EU’s motives, driving forces and limitations behind expressing its
commitment to the R2P can serve as indicators for the general role and functions
the EU will take on in its external relations and as a member of the international
community in the future and will shed light onto the effectiveness of the EU’s
commitment to the R2P.
Before discussing the EU’s interest in the promotion and the implementation
of the R2P in more detail, the next section will outline the collective aspects of the
R2P and the general role assigned to regional organizations as members of the
international community. This will be followed by a brief look at the EU’s place
within the R2P framework whose focus on conflicts and crises outside its own
region and outside its own membership is unique. The third section will analyse
the EU’s interest in the R2P by addressing the factors that inspired the EU’s
openness towards the concept and by examining whether the EU’s commitment to
the R2P falls within its general ambitions to contribute to international secur-
ity – and thereby to European regional stability, or whether the EU perceives its
contribution to the R2P as a question of solidarity and is thereby placing human
suffering at the core of its considerations. The final section of the article will
scrutinize to what extent the EU can pursue its own interest in the R2P and to
what extent the diverging interests of its Member States are preventing the EU
from forming and implementing a strong stance on the R2P in specific humani-
tarian crises, facilitated by the distribution of competences between the EU and its
Member States in the EU’s external relations.
2 THE COLLECTIVE ASPECTS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT AND THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The concept of the R2P is still subject of much controversy, despite celebrating its
tenth anniversary in 2015. The debate centres on its nature, namely whether it is a
legal, a moral or a political concept and the partly interlinked question regarding its
precise content. The latter discussion includes a variety of topics, and in particular
whether the R2P entails not only a right but even an obligation to intervene in
order to protect populations from serious harm; whether the R2P is restricted to
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity; and whether
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and if so to what extent the R2P represents something entirely new within the
international legal framework.17 In general, the EU links its commitment to the
R2P to the development of the concept at the level of the UN,18 and it is this
framework which will be analysed with regards to the role assigned to regional
organizations in implementing the R2P in the following.
By the UN Secretary-General, the R2P has been described as a political
concept19 that is deeply rooted in existing international law, including interna-
tional human rights law, international humanitarian law as well as refugee law.20
The UN has adopted a ‘narrow but deep’ approach to the R2P which signifies that
the concept only applies to the four atrocity crimes explicitly mentioned in the
World Summit Outcome Document but that the response to the atrocity crimes should
be broad and could employ ‘the wide array of prevention and protection instru-
ments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and sub-
regional organizations and their civil society partners’.21 Possible responses could
include ‘appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accor-
dance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter’ and ‘collective action’ in
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.22
Of significance is that the R2P is understood not just as the individual
responsibility of states but also as a ‘collective’ one.23 The collective responsibility
to help protect populations from atrocity crimes is focusing on ‘the responsibility
that a variety of actors have, at different levels, to assist in protecting potential
victims’,24 through assisting states in meeting their core protection responsibilities
in a supplementary fashion.25 Unlike the controversially discussed right to huma-
nitarian interventions, the R2P does not focus on a military response but lies on
prevention initiatives and on peaceful measures.26 Assistance and capacity building
17 G. De Baere, The EU and the Responsibility to Protect, in The EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal
Dimension 95–109, 96–99 (B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans & J Wouters eds, Oxford University Press
2013); C. Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm? 101(1) Am. J. Int’l L.,
99–120 (2007).
18 The EU Priorities for the 64th General Assembly of the United Nations, e.g. expressed the EU’s support for
the UN Secretary-General’s efforts in implementing R2P ‘within the UN’ and acknowledged his
balanced three pillar strategy. See Council of the EU, Political and Security Committee, EU Priorities
for the 64th General United Nations General Assembly, 10809/09, at annex para. 8 (Brussels 9 June 2009).
19 Report of the Secretary-General, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance and the
Responsibility to Protect, A/68/947 – S/2014/449, at para. 2 (11 July 2014).
20 Report of the Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, A/66//874-S/
2012/578, A/66//874-S/2012/578, at para. 9 (25 July 2012).
21 Secretary-General, supra n. 1, at paras 10(c), 11. UN General Assembly, supra n. 2, at para. 138.
22 UN General Assembly, supra n. 2, at para. 139.
23 Report of the Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, A/64/864
(14 July 2010), at para. 12.
24 Secretary-General, supra n. 19, at para. 13.
25 Secretary-General, supra n. 1, at para. 14.
26 General Assembly, supra n. 2, at paras 138–39; Secretary-General, supra n. 1, at para. 11(b); Secretary-
General, supra n. 19; Secretary-General, supra n. 20, at paras 3, 19.
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by the international community are closely connected to prevention.27 Prevention
in itself is a broad concept, including long term structural initiatives as well as
short-term operational responses applied to avoid the escalation of atrocities at an
early stage.28
Preventive and responsive action in the spirit of the R2P is understood by the
UN to be most effective when carried out in partnership with ‘regional actors’.29
Although regional organizations have the potential to contribute to all three pillars
of the R2P, their key strength is seen to lie in their ability to help states in building
and exercising their sovereignty responsibly, thereby limiting the need for third
parties to intervene in order to stop atrocity crimes. Regional organizations can
assist states by identifying their existing obligations under public international law
and they can help to monitor and address internal tensions before they escalate into
atrocity crimes.30 Regional organizations can contribute to structural prevention
initiatives through the ‘development of norms, standards and institutions that
promote tolerance, transparency, accountability, and the constructive management
of diversity’.31 Although the R2P is understood to be a ‘universal principle […]
each region will operationalize the principle at its own pace and its own way’,32
building ‘on the normative traditions and institutional capacities that already exist
in each region and culture’.33
The terminology of ‘regional ownership’34 already indicates that regional
organizations are attributed with a special responsibility towards their own region
and their own Member States as part of the collective aspects of the R2P. This
understanding of a special collective responsibility is influenced by the perceived
closeness of regional actors to their Member States and in a heightened interest in
keeping their own region stable.35 Regional organizations are understood to have a
greater awareness of when tensions within the region are intensifying and when
and how the international community could step in to help.36 This special
collective responsibility of regional organizations for their own region and their
27 Secretary-General, supra n. 19.
28 Report of the Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, A/65/877 – S/2011/393, at para. 21 (28 June 2011).
29 Secretary-General, supra n. 20, at para. 20.
30 Secretary-General, supra n. 28, at para. 17.
31 Ibid., at para. 23.
32 Ibid., at para. 8.
33 Ibid., at para. 26.
34 Ibid., at para. 8.
35 The intra-regional focus of the R2P also becomes visible in the Secretary-General’s Report on
Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to Early Action, supra n. 5, at para. 46(c) which asks regional
arrangements to ‘Support their Member States’. See also Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing
Collective Action: The Next Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, A/70/999-S/2016/620, at para. 59 (22
July 2016).
36 Secretary-General, supra n. 28, at para. 24.
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own membership is reflected in the legal framework provided for in the UN
Charter.37 Regional organizations have been attributed with the primary respon-
sibility to settle local disputes peacefully,38 and this responsibility is restricted to a
regional actor’s own sphere of membership.39
This is not to say that regional organizations are not addressed by the
collective aspects of the R2P when non-Member States are in need of help.40
The R2P is perceived to be a ‘continuing responsibility to support policies that are
directed at atrocity crime prevention and response’ which is best tackled in
partnership with other international actors.41 Therefore, if states or regions that
are closer to a specific situation are already engaged, more distant observers are not
cleared of their collective responsibility.42 In some scenarios, actors that are not in
close proximity to a crisis might even have a more balanced perspective, being less
influenced by political as well as economic bias.43
The responsibility of regional organizations in contributing to the prevention of
atrocity crimes outside their membership is also in line with the framework of the UN
Charter. Accordingly, regional organizations can offer peaceful methods of dispute
resolution, including dialogue, mediation, negotiation or good offices, based on the
consent of the parties to a dispute.44 In case a response is required, regional organiza-
tions need to be authorized by the UN Security Council to use military force.45 When
putting on the perspective of the R2P, the difference between a regional organiza-
tion’s special collective responsibility in relation to its own region and its own Member
States on the one hand and a regional organization’s general collective responsibility to
prevent atrocity crimes wherever they might occur, can be seen in the heightened
political and moral pressure that can be created if a regional organization would turn a
blind eye to an intra-regional crisis.46
37 Schmidt, supra n. 14, at 132.
38 Arts 33(1), 52(2) UN Charter.
39 J. Schmidt, Regional Security and International Law, in Security and International Law 69–92, 78–79 (J.
Schmidt, M. E. Footer, N. D. White & L. Davies-Bright eds, Hart 2016).
40 J. Schmidt, The EU-UN Partnership in Light of the Responsibility to Protect, in The EU, Strategy and
Security Policy: Regional and Strategic Challenges 135–49, 140, 135 (L. Chappell, J. Mawdsley & P. Petrov
eds, Routledge 2016).
41 Secretary-General, supra n. 19, at para. 20.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., at para. 23; Secretary-General, supra n. 28, at para. 24.
44 Art. 33(1) UN Charter.
45 Arts 42, 48; 53(1) UN Charter. See also N. D. White, The EU as a Regional Security Actor Within the
International Legal Order, in European Security Law 329–49, 342–44 (M. Trybus & N. D. White eds, Oxford
University Press 2007). In favour of ‘regional organizations as alternative authorising mechanisms’ is B.
Adediran, Implementing R2P: Towards a Regional Solution?, 9(4) Global Resp. to Protect 459–87 (2017).
46 For a discussion on the allocation of responsibilities within the R2P, see T. Erskine, Moral Agents of
Protection and Supplementary Responsibilities to Protect, in The Oxford Handbook on the Responsibility to
Protect 167–86 (A. J. Bellamy & T. Dunne eds, Oxford University Press 2016).
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3 THE EUs PERSPECTIVE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
When turning to the EU’s perspective on the R2P, it becomes apparent that in
political statements, the EU supports the R2P and highlights the shared responsi-
bility it holds with other actors of the international community.47 The focus of the
EU’s commitment to the R2P is put on states and regions outside its membership.
The EUGS provides that:
[w]e will therefore act promptly to prevent violent conflict, be able and ready to respond
responsibly yet decisively to crises, facilitate locally owned agreements, and commit long-
term. We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while
pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes
of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human
rights.48
It is this outward-looking perspective in its commitment to the R2P which sets the
EU apart from other regional organizations such as the African Union, for
example.49 With its comprehensive approach to crisis management, which covers
the whole life cycle of a crisis, from conflict prevention to post-conflict stabiliza-
tion, and which utilizes a variety of peaceful and coercive measures, including
development cooperation, humanitarian aid, trade, political and diplomatic tools,
as well as economic sanctions, and military operations,50 the EU’s crisis manage-
ment concept is well-suited for the R2P’s ‘narrow but deep’ approach adopted at
the UN level. The same can be said for the EU’s preferences for prevention
initiatives that are either short term or long term in nature.51
Nevertheless, the EU’s outward looking focus on the R2P which is in line
with a regional organization’s general collective responsibility within the R2P
framework, raises questions about the EU’s specific interest in the R2P. It might
be wondered whether the EU’s commitment to the R2P outside its own region
and outside its own membership is merely putting on a new label on its traditional
external policy objectives and crisis management activities without providing
anything substantially new. The EU’s increased institutional engagement with
the R2P and the centre stage the R2P takes in the EUGS indicate otherwise.
47 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, J. Solana, Report on the Implementation of the European
Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World, S407/08, at 2, 12 (Brussels 11 Dec. 2008); EU,
supra n. 7, at 17–18, 42; Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External
Conflicts and Crises, 5431/18, at para. 4 (Brussels 22 Jan. 2018); see also Joint Statement by the Council and
the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European
Parliament and the European Commission, supra n. 7, at para. 66.
48 EU, supra n. 7.
49 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Art. 4(h).
50 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy 7, 11 (Brussels 12 Dec.
2003), http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.
51 Ibid., at 11; EU, supra n. 7, at 18.
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3.1 INCREASED INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITY AND THE EU global strategy
In recent years, the EU institutions are increasingly engaging with the R2P.
Amongst them, in particular the EP and the EEAS are involved in the promotion
for the respect of the R2P.52 In 2013, the EP adopted recommendations on the
R2P addressed to all actors involved in the EU’s external relations, including the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the
EEAS, the Commission, the Council and the EU Member States. The recom-
mendations emphasized the prevention component of the R2P, including media-
tion and preventive diplomacy and called for the EU to ‘continue to play a
leadership role’ in this field.53 In addition, the EP called for the identification of
‘an EU Focal Point for R2P in the EEAS’.54 The topic of the R2P is regularly
featuring on the agenda of the EP.55
Within the EEAS, a Focal Point on the R2P has now been created, signifying
the importance assigned to the R2P by the EU. The EU’s engagement with the
R2P is based on a close working relationship with the UN. Members of the EP
and of the EEAS consult and communicate with the UN Secretary-General’s
Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.56 Through the sharing of good
practices and lessons learned, the EU contributes to the further development of the
concept of the R2P at the international level. The EU’s efforts in implementing
the R2P have been positively received in the UN Secretary-General’s 2018 report
on The Responsibility to Protect: From Early Warning to Early Action.57
It is not only the increased institutional awareness and sensitivity for the R2P
within the EEAS and the EP which point towards the importance of the R2P
debate for the EU as an international actor. Although the term ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ is mentioned in the EUGS only once,58 the terminology and content of
the EU’s comprehensive security strategy reveals a strong influence of the R2P
debate at the level of the UN. For example, the EUGS expresses the EU’s aim to
promote resilient states and societies in its neighbouring regions, including Central
Africa and Central Asia, based on the notion that ‘[a] resilient state is a secure state,
52 See e.g. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 4 July 2017 on Addressing Human Rights
Violations in the Context of War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, Including Genocide, (2016/2239
(INI)), P8_TA(2017)0288; European Parliament, European Parliament Recommendation of 5 July 2018 to
the Council on the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (2018/2040(INI)), P8_TA-PROV
(2018)0312.
53 European Parliament, supra n. 8, at paras N, O.
54 Ibid., at para. 1(h).
55 See e.g. European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 4 Feb. 2016 on the Systematic Mass
Murder of Religious Minorities by the so-called ‘ISIS/Daesh’, (2016/2529(RSP)), P8_TA(2016)0051.
56 Interview with the advisor of a political group in the EP (Feb. 2018); interview with EEAS policy
officers (Mar. 2018).
57 Secretary-General, supra n. 5, at para. 13.
58 EU, supra n. 7, at 42.
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and security is key for prosperity and democracy’.59 As part of its contribution to
‘more stable and peaceful societies’, the EU has committed itself to the protection
of children in armed conflict, for example, and has supported initiatives designed to
prevent their recruitment and use, to support the release of child soldiers as well as
their reintegration into society, and is supporting UN efforts in this context.60
The EU’s ambition is aimed at supporting ‘inclusive and accountable govern-
ance’ based on the rule of law as a key to creating an atmosphere in which
communities are not repressed or marginalized and in which human rights are
protected.61 The EU’s emphasis on resilience is linked to the EU’s increased focus
on local or regional ownership and becomes visible in the Africa-EU Strategic
Partnership, for example.62 In 2013, when the EP stressed cooperation between
regional organizations as an important element of the R2P, it also expressed its
support for the promotion of ‘African ownership of R2P’.63
Rather than interpreting the references to resilience and local or regional
ownership as a weakened commitment to the R2P, indicating a re-distribution
of responsibilities away from the EU to other communities, the EU’s terminology
echoes the UN Secretary-General’s common principles on assistance, which have
been designed to guide the efforts of members of the international community in
fulfilling their collective responsibility under the R2P.64 Based on past experience,
international assistance is viewed by the UN to be more impactful ‘when aligned
with national priorities’.65 The emphasis on national ownership rests on the
assumption that ‘[n]ational actors are usually best placed to identify risk factors
for atrocity crimes and to develop effective mitigation strategies’.66 The success of a
state in protecting its population is considered to be dependent ‘on the
59 Ibid., at 23.
60 EEAS, Statement on behalf of the EU and its Member States by Mr Gerton Van den Akker, EU
Statement at the Security Council Open Debate on ‘Children and Armed Conflict’, Unique ID: 180709_13 (9
July 2018); EEAS, Statement on Behalf of the EU and Its Member States by Mr Gustavo Martin Prada,
United Nations Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting on Protecting Boys and Girls in Shrinking
Humanitarian Space, Unique ID: 190212_13 (12 Feb. 2019); EEAS, Joint Statement by HRVP Federica
Mogherini and UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Virginia Gamba on the International
Day Against the Use of Child Soldiers, Unique ID: 190212_8 (12 Feb. 2019). UN Security Council
Resolution 2427 (2018).
61 EU, supra n. 7, at 26.
62 Council of the EU, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 16344/07, at paras 6,
18 (Presse 291) (Lisbon 9 Dec. 2007). The strategy refers to the ‘principle of African ownership’. See
also EEAS, Statement of the EU and Its Member States by H. E. Mr João Vale de Almeida at the UN
Security Council Open Debate, Silencing the Guns in Africa: Cooperation Between the United Nations and
Regional Organizations, Unique ID: 190227_25 (27 Feb. 2019).
63 European Parliament, supra n. 8, at para P.
64 Secretary-General, supra n. 19, at paras 13, 14. For a critical view on ‘resilience’, see W. Wagner & R.
Anholt, Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s New Leitmotif: Pragmatic, Problematic or Promising?, 37(3)
Contemp. Sec. Pol’y 414–30 (2016).
65 Secretary-General, supra n. 19, at para. 14(a).
66 Ibid.
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commitment of national actors to fulfil their responsibility’ and that ‘[w]here a
genuine will to build resilience is lacking at the national level […] the potential
contribution of outside actors will be limited’.67 Thus, the wording of the EUGS
which serves as guidelines for the EU’s engagement with the wider world, reveal
the EU’s strong commitment to the R2P.
3.2 THE EU’s interest in the responsibility to protect
In order to assess the EU’s motivation behind its support for the R2P and to
uncover the EU’s specific interest in the R2P, the next section will question
whether the EU’s commitment to the R2P is part of its general ambitions to
contribute to international security – and thereby to European regional stability, or
whether the EU perceives its contribution to the R2P as a question of solidarity
and is thereby placing human suffering at the core of its considerations.
Amongst members of the EP and within the EEAS, the EU’s interest behind
its commitment to the R2P is often seen as a combination of both – as an
expression of solidarity with human suffering and as a contribution to international
stability and security, as the prevention of human suffering can help to provide
stability and security in turn.68 With its contribution to international stability, the
EU is indirectly contributing to European regional security. The link between the
different interests becomes visible in the EUGS. The EU’s security strategy is
firmly based on the understanding of the interconnectedness of internal and
external security threats and states that:
our [European] security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and
surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human
security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world.69
The EU’s investment in ‘African peace and development’ is regarded as an
investment in European security and prosperity, for example.70 The EUGS also
reveals a strong human centred approach by acknowledging that the breaking
down of fragile states and the crises they result in, together with the ‘unspeakable
violence and human suffering to which they give rise, threaten our shared vital
interests’.71 Individual statements made on behalf of the EU in the context of
67 Ibid., at para. 14(b).
68 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56; written responses, members of the EP (Feb. and Apr.
2018); interview with advisor of a political group in the EP, supra n. 56. See also EEAS, Statement on
behalf of the EU and its Member States by Ambassador Joanne Adamson, Debate on ‘The Responsibility
to Protect and the Prevention of Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity’,
Unique ID: 180625_13 (New York 25 June 2018) which states that ‘[t]he Responsibility to Protect is
at the core of our primary goal, namely to allow our populations to live in peace and security’.
69 EU, supra n. 7, at 14.
70 Ibid., at 36.
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specific humanitarian crises also include a focus on human suffering. Following the
military intervention in Libya in 2011 in the name of the R2P, for example, the
EU increased its humanitarian aid, motivated by ‘Europe’s solidarity’ and by the
EU’s ambition to ‘relentlessly […] relieve the plight of the affected men, women
and children’.72
The EU’s motivation for supporting the R2P is seen to rest on a multitude of
factors, including the EU’s own origin as a peace project in the aftermath of the
Second World War, following the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in
Europe. The EU’s openness towards the R2P is also influenced by the individual
experiences of some of its Member States with atrocity crimes within and outside
Europe, such as the French experience with the genocide in Rwanda and the
Dutch experience with the massacre in Srebrenica.73 Both atrocities have been
triggers for the R2P debate at the international level.74 Of further significance for
the EU’s backing of the R2P is that the concept’s origin is linked to the UN
through its endorsement at the 2005 UN World Summit. The identification of the
R2P as UN concept is considered to generate a heightened level of commitment
within the EU, reflecting the special importance of the EU-UN relationship for
the EU.75 The EU’s traditional support for the UN ‘as the bedrock of the multi-
lateral rules-based order’76 and for its principles become visible in the EU’s
persistent call for effective multilateralism and in primary EU law.77
In general, the concept of the R2P appears to be a natural fit for the EU as a
project that is based on principles and values, of which the promotion and the
protection of human rights are implicit.78 Putting human beings at the centre of its
considerations is viewed to be a European tradition and as an essential element of
the EU’s democratic foreign policy.79 Since the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon, the promotion of the EU’s values through its external relations is not
merely an EU objective anymore, but was transformed into an obligation as
indicated by the wording of the missionary principle in Article 3(5) Treaty on
European Union.80 In order to promote the respect for human rights, the rule of
71 Ibid., at 28.
72 European Commission, Europe Boosts Its Humanitarian Aid in the Libyan Crisis, IP/11/621 (Brussels 23
May 2011).
73 Interview with member of the German Bundestag No. 2 (Apr. 2018).
74 Secretary-General, supra n. 19, at para. 2.
75 Interview with member of the EP (Mar. 2018); interview with member of the German Bundestag No.
1 (Apr. 2018).
76 EU, supra n. 7, at 10.
77 Ibid., at 43; European Council, supra n. 50; Arts 3(5), 21(1–2), 42(1) TEU.
78 See Arts 2, 3, 21 TEU.
79 Interview with member of the German Bundestag No. 1, supra n. 75.
80 M. Broberg, What Is the Direction for the EU’s Development Cooperation After Lisbon?-A Legal
Examination, 16(4) Eur. For. Affairs Rev. 539–57, 548 (2011).
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law and democracy, the EU traditionally uses a carrot and stick approach. The EU
has developed the practice of making its development aid for third states condi-
tional upon the compliance with human rights standards, for example.81 The same
applies for trade preferences under the framework of the EU’s common commer-
cial policy either in context of the Generalized System of Preferences or in the
context individual trade agreements.82 In addition, the EU uses targeted restrictive
measures in response to human rights violations, as has been the case in Libya and
Syria, for example.
At the same time, the R2P is perceived to signify a new development and to
differ from the EU’s traditional support for the protection of human rights in the
EU’s external relations.83 The novelty of the concept is predominantly understood
to be its focus on prevention.84
In particular within the EEAS, the R2P is treated as a cross-cutting concept,
including conflict prevention and peace-building and as a concept which is con-
cerned with policy-making and action.85 Of significance is that the R2P has led to
a shift in focus for the EU.86 Through the inclusion of indicators for atrocity
prevention, the R2P now forms one of the dimensions of the EU Conflict Early
Warning System (EWS) and is part of the whole conflict response cycle.87 The
prevention of atrocities has been integrated into the EU’s CSDP missions and
operations and into the EU’s capacity building programmes, based on the New
European Consensus on Development.88 The aim to create a toolkit to help with the
‘early detection and prevention of atrocities’ was identified in 2017.89 The Atrocity
81 On the EU’s human rights conditionality, see L. Bartels, The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to
Human Rights in Trade and Investment Agreements (Study requested jointly by the European Parliament’s
Subcommittee on Human Rights and by the Committee on International Trade), PE 433.751,
EXPO/B/DROI/2012–09 (Feb. 2014). On the suspension of development aid, see C. Portela,
European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why do They Work? 127–47 (Routledge 2010).
82 See e.g. Portela, supra n. 81, at 148–61.
83 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
84 Interview with the advisor of a political group in the EP, supra n. 56; interview with member of the
German Bundestag No. 1, supra n. 75.
85 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. The EU’s efforts in integrating the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes developed by the UN
Secretary-General’s Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect has
been recognized by the UN. See Secretary-General (2016), supra n. 35, at para. 41. The EWS is
designed as ‘a robust, evidence-based risk management tool that identifies, assesses and helps prioritise
situations at risks of violent conflict for non-EU countries, focusing on structural factors’ and ‘also
identifies conflict prevention and peacebuilding opportunities’. See EU, EU Conflict Early Warning
System (Factsheet) (Sept. 2014), www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/
201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf; see also European Commission, Joint Staff Working
Document, EU Conflict Early Warning System: Objectives, Process and Guidance for Implementation SWD
(2016) 3 final (Brussels 14 Jan. 2016).
88 EEAS, supra n. 68.
89 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament & the Council, A Strategic
Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External Action, JOIN(2017) 21 final, at 20 (Brussels 7 June 2017).
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Prevention Toolkit, as part of the EWS is designed to provide EU staff anywhere
in the world with ‘specific hands-on knowledge’ in this regard,90 and has already
been informally shared in February 2018.91 It is not only the shift in focus through
the R2P which is worth highlighting but also that the identification of early signs
of atrocities is now linked to early action,92 revealing the EU’s commitment to
improving the implementation of the R2P. The 2018 Council Conclusions on the
Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises, for example, stress the importance
of ‘atrocity prevention in the context of the prevention of conflicts and crises’ and
the need to develop ‘a culture of early action’.93
4 THE IMPACT OF DIFFERING EU MEMBER STATE PREFERENCES
ON THE EU’S ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT ITS COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Internally, the EU has made profound changes inspired by its support for the R2P,
most visibly through the introduction of an ‘R2P lens’94 into the EWS. The EU’s
commitment to the collective aspects of the R2P is driven by its solidarity with
human suffering in combination with its aim to provide international stability and
thereby also European security. In its ambition to better implement the R2P, the
EU has linked the early identification of risk factors for atrocity crimes to its call for
early action. The effectiveness of the EU’s endeavours to close the gap between
early warning and early action depends to some extent on generating the political
willingness amongst its Member States to act in the name of the R2P. In most
policy fields falling within the EU’s external relations, the EU Member States are
still the dominant actors and their political willingness and political preferences still
matter. If consensus cannot be reached within the Council, the constitutional
structure of the EU is preventing the EU from using specific crisis management
tools, such as restrictive measures or military crisis management operations, for
example.95 In the absence of a European army, the latter have to be carried out by
90 Statement by HR/VP Federica Mogherini on the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the
Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of this Crime Unique ID: 171209_8 (Brussels 9 Dec.
2017).
91 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56. The EU’s review of its early warning system and the
shift towards early action has been positively received by the UN Secretary-General, see supra n. 5, at
para. 13.
92 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
93 Council of the EU (2018), supra n. 47, at para. 12. See also European Commission, supra n. 89, at 19
and Council of the EU, United Nations Working Party (CONUN), Recommendations on Promoting and
Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect by the EU and EU Member States, at para. 1 (3 May 2018),
http://www.mzz.gov.si/en/foreign_policy_and_international_law/responsibility_to_protect/.
94 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
95 Arts 29, 31(1–2) TEU; Art. 215 TFEU; Art. 42(4) TEU.
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capable and willing EU Member States who bear most of the costs according to
principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’ and the Athena mechanism.96
Some EU Member States in general are more reluctant than others to resort to
military measures97 and the domestic debates accompanying the Libyan and Syrian
military interventions also uncovered different views on whether the use of force
in the name of the R2P requires UN Security Council authorization.98 In addi-
tion, not all EU Member States seem to agree on the ‘narrow but deep’ approach
to the R2P adopted by the UN which signifies that the concept only applies to
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.99 France, for
example, also considers that humanitarian emergencies caused by natural disasters
are capable of triggering the R2P,100 a view which has not been shared by the
EP.101
Although the expectations on the R2P differ between EU Member States and
although they have different types of foreign policy tools at their disposal that can
be used in the name of the R2P, EU Member States are viewed to be supportive
of the EU’s initiatives in the name of the R2P, especially when the EU is carrying
out its commitment to the R2P within its own competences, using its own foreign
policy tools.102 In particular with regards to the EU’s efforts in conflict prevention,
a wide level of acceptance has been expressed.103
The EU has a variety of instruments at its disposal which can be used for
prevention purposes, including mediation and dialogue and it is prevention the EU
is focusing on in its commitment to implement the R2P.104 In order to enhance
the EU’s ‘unique potential […] in global mediation engagements’ the 2018
Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises for
example stresses the:
96 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of
European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena) and repealing Decision 2011/871/
CFSP, OJ L 84/39 (2015), Arts 15, 28; F. Terpan, Financing Common Security and Defence Policy
Operations: Explaining Change and Inertia in a Fragmented and Flexible Structure, 24(2) European Security
221-63, 225-26 (2015).
97 A. Menon, European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya, 53(3) Survival 75–90, 82–83 (2011).
98 Under the UN Charter framework, the non-consensual use of force outside the context of self-
defence requires UN Security Council authorisation, Arts 2(4), 42, 48, 51, 53(2) UN Charter.
99 On different EU Member State approaches, see S. Brockmeier, G. Kurtz & J. Junk, Emerging Norm and
Rhetorical Tool: Europe and a Responsibility to Protect, 14(4) Conflict, Sec. & Dev., 429–60 (2014); D.
Fiott & M. Vincent, The European Union, in An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect 199–
219, 204–08 (G. Zyberi ed., Cambridge University Press 2013).
100 D. Carment, J. Landry & S. Winchester, The Role of Regional Organizations: A Responsibility Gap, in
The Oxford Handbook on the Responsibility to Protect 335–54, 344 (A. J. Bellamy & T. Dunne eds,
Oxford University Press 2016).
101 European Parliament, supra n. 8, at para AB.
102 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
103 Ibid.
104 EEAS, supra n. 68.
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need to further build up the mediation capacities of the EEAS to assist in prevention and
resolution of local and national conflicts and further work on the ability to rapidly deploy
mediation expertise to EU delegations and in support of other international and regional
organizations whenever appropriate, also with sufficient emphasis on its use in early
action.105
EU Member States are said to be becoming more aware of the tools available at the
EU level in the context of mediation and are increasingly seeking the EU’s help
and advice on this matter.106
The different national approaches of EU Member States to the R2P not
necessarily needs to lead to contradictions with EU efforts in implementing the
R2P. Rather, the refinement of the concept of the R2P and its implementation
benefit from shared learned lessons and good practices. This applies not only in the
relationship between the UN and regional organizations in general but also in the
relationship between the EU and its Member States.107 Besides the EU Focal Point
on the R2P which has been established within the EEAS, EU Member States have
created national R2P Focal Points. Since 2013, the European focal points come
together every two years for a Regional R2P Focal Points Meeting for Europe in
Slovenia.108 In addition, a network at the technical level between those who carry
out and work with the R2P has been put in place in order to exchange ideas and
information.109
The closeness of individual EU Member States to particular countries and
regions can be an advantage for the EU’s commitment to the R2P. EU Member
States’ particular insights and relationships with specific states have the potential to
create greater awareness for potential risk factors for atrocity crimes in specific parts
of the world and can help to establish the required moral and political pressure
needed for common initiatives in the spirit of the R2P within the EU framework.
The EU Member States are closely involved in the EWS and their active partici-
pation is viewed by the EEAS as key to its success.110 In addition, the seat of EU
Member States in the UN Security Council as permanent or non-permanent
members and their potential to influence the decisions of the UN Security
Council are considered to be a great advantage to the EU who does not have a
seat in the Security Council itself.111 The French/Mexican initiative on the non-
105 Council of the EU (2018), supra n. 47, at para. 10.
106 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
107 See e.g. European Commission, Joint Staff Working Documents, Progress Report on the Implementation of
the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises: Action Plan 2015, SWD(2016) 253
final, at 7 (Brussels 18 July 2016).
108 For more information on the Global Network of R2P Focal Points, see http://www.globalr2p.org/
resources/1008.
109 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
110 Ibid.
111 Interview with the advisor of a political group in the EP, supra n. 56.
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use of the veto power in the UN Security Council in the case of mass atrocities is a
positive example in this regard.112
5 CONCLUSION
The EU’s commitment to the R2P is influenced by a combination of interests. By
contributing to the fulfilment of the collective aspects of the R2P, the EU
expresses its solidarity with human suffering and thereby also contributes to
international stability and security. The human centred focus and the significance
of the R2P debate for the EU becomes visible throughout the EUGS. The
terminology used by the EU, including resilience and national ownership reveals
a close alignment of the EU’s commitment to the R2P with the development and
further refinement of the concept of the R2P at the UN level. In its commitment
to the R2P, the EU acts as a close partner to the UN and participates in the R2P
dialogue at the international level.
The distribution of competences between the EU and its Member States in policy
areas that fall within the EU’s external relations imply that the EU can often only
become visible as an international actor through the use of specific crisis management
tools if consensus can be reached among EU Member States. This does not imply that
the EU is not efficient in fulfilling its commitment to the R2P and that the EU has not
developed a unique interest in the R2P either. Rather than the third pillar of the R2P,
the focus of the EU’s activities in the context of the R2P has been put on atrocity
prevention. For the EU, prevention starts by raising awareness for the R2P agenda
within the EU’s own services, including headquarters, delegations and EU officials,
through educating and informing them about the R2P and on the identification of
early signs of atrocity crimes.113 Indicators for atrocity prevention have been intro-
duced in the EWS and the EU has started to use an ‘R2P lens’. The latter can help to
further improve the use of the instruments available to the EU in a more coordinated
and effective manner and to generate the required awareness and political willingness
to act in the name of the R2P. In its ambition to improve the implementation of the
R2P and to narrow the gap between early warning and early action when faced with
the risk of atrocity crimes, the EU collaborates with its Member States and the UN in
order to find multilateral solutions.
112 Political Statement on the Suspension of the Veto in Case of Mass Atrocities, presented by France and Mexico
during the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, https://onu.delegfrance.org/France-and-the-
UN-Reform-8615.
113 Interview with EEAS policy officers, supra n. 56.
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